Universalizability and Philippine Supreme Court Cases :: Criminal Justice

Universalizability and Philippine Supreme Court Cases ABSTRACT: The requirement that legal reasoning be universalizable is so unquestioned as a legal doctrine that it is practically axiomatic. Recently, two Philippine Supreme Court cases have been decided in a manner that apparently dispenses with this requirement. I discuss these two cases in the light of the requirement. I conclude that the requirement, rather than being diminished by the two cases, has actually maintained its axiomatic status on the basis that the reasoning in the two cases is deficient: the first either for inequality in treatment or for lack of clear guidance, and the second for the failure to appear impartial. The requirement that judicial reasoning be universalizable, that the justifying reasons for a decision are to be articulated or at least must be capable of being articulated in the form of a universal norm under which the facts of the case are to be subsumed so as to entail logically the decision, (1) is an acknowledged formal legal principle indispensable to any sound theory of adjudication. Recently, two Philippine Supreme Court Decisions, Alonzo v. IAC (2) and Marcos v. Manglapus, (3) challenged the very indispensability of such a requirement. This paper will discuss the interaction between and effects of these two decisions on the requirement of universalizability, by determining whether the requirement is indeed seriously challenged by the two cases and, conversely, by assessing and analyzing these two cases in terms of the requirement. These two decisions resolved the issues in the two cases by creating exceptions for the unique circumstances attendant to the cases, thus apparently dispensing with the requirement. In particular, the Alonzo case held: "In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the Cojenero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the particular circumstances of the case." (4) In the Marcos case, reference was made to the special circumstances involving President Marcos thus: "This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself." (5) In discussing the interaction between and effects of these two decisions on the requirement of universalizability, the paper will first briefly explain the rationale behind the requirement. Universalizability and Philippine Supreme Court Cases :: Criminal Justice Universalizability and Philippine Supreme Court Cases ABSTRACT: The requirement that legal reasoning be universalizable is so unquestioned as a legal doctrine that it is practically axiomatic. Recently, two Philippine Supreme Court cases have been decided in a manner that apparently dispenses with this requirement. I discuss these two cases in the light of the requirement. I conclude that the requirement, rather than being diminished by the two cases, has actually maintained its axiomatic status on the basis that the reasoning in the two cases is deficient: the first either for inequality in treatment or for lack of clear guidance, and the second for the failure to appear impartial. The requirement that judicial reasoning be universalizable, that the justifying reasons for a decision are to be articulated or at least must be capable of being articulated in the form of a universal norm under which the facts of the case are to be subsumed so as to entail logically the decision, (1) is an acknowledged formal legal principle indispensable to any sound theory of adjudication. Recently, two Philippine Supreme Court Decisions, Alonzo v. IAC (2) and Marcos v. Manglapus, (3) challenged the very indispensability of such a requirement. This paper will discuss the interaction between and effects of these two decisions on the requirement of universalizability, by determining whether the requirement is indeed seriously challenged by the two cases and, conversely, by assessing and analyzing these two cases in terms of the requirement. These two decisions resolved the issues in the two cases by creating exceptions for the unique circumstances attendant to the cases, thus apparently dispensing with the requirement. In particular, the Alonzo case held: "In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the Cojenero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the particular circumstances of the case." (4) In the Marcos case, reference was made to the special circumstances involving President Marcos thus: "This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic and social havoc in the country and within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself." (5) In discussing the interaction between and effects of these two decisions on the requirement of universalizability, the paper will first briefly explain the rationale behind the requirement.